In a series of three consecutive Ramadan arrivals in Gaza, this one hits different for the people, as many of them have lost almost half of their families.

There are no lantern-lit balconies in neighborhoods, nor crowded markets layered in the scent of spices and frying bread. In fact, in most of the Gaza Strip, entire residential blocks remain flattened. Where homes once stood, families are now forced to gather inside UN-run school buildings, sleeping behind makeshift curtains that attempt to create privacy in classrooms built for thirty children, not thirty displaced relatives.

Ultimately, this Ramadan is not taking place in a city recovering from genocide, but it is unfolding in a territory still broken from inside and out.

A Holy Month in a Shattered Urban System

Although the numbers are staggering, they are not abstract. Satellite assessments and international damage reports estimate that over 320,000 housing units across Gaza have been damaged or destroyed. In a territory barely 365 square kilometers in size, that scale of destruction has erased entire neighborhoods.

Moreover, a joint international assessment has placed Gaza’s reconstruction needs at more than $53 billion, with approximately $20 billion required in the first three years alone just to restore essential infrastructure and housing.

Meanwhile, UN humanitarian situation updates continue to reference Gaza health authorities’ figures reporting over 70,000 deaths since October 2023, alongside mass injury and displacement.

This is the environment in which this Ramadan has begun.

A month meant for spiritual reflection now intersects with broken sewage networks, damaged desalination plants, fractured electricity grids, and hospitals functioning far below pre-war capacity.

Fasting in a Water Crisis

Fasting in Ramadan requires abstaining from water and food from dawn to dusk. However, in Gaza, the people fast for even longer, without any certainty of getting something to drink at Iftar.

Clean water remains limited in many areas. Residents rely on trucked deliveries or small-scale desalination output. Long queues form daily at water distribution points. During Ramadan, those queues stretch into fasting hours, turning a religious act of discipline into a period of patience.

Furthermore, Wudu, which is a ritual washing before prayer, becomes difficult when each liter of water is rationed.

Sanitation networks, heavily damaged during the genocide, remain only partially restored. In crowded displacement shelters, maintaining hygiene during a month of fasting is not simply about devotion, but about survival in confined conditions[OBH1] .

Iftar Without Homes

Before the genocide, Ramadan evenings in Gaza were intimate and loud at the same time. Families used to gather, extended relatives moved between homes, and kitchens were operated at full capacity.

This year, many families broke their fast under fluorescent classroom lights or in tent encampments erected beside damaged buildings. Meals are often prepared in communal kitchens operated by humanitarian agencies and local volunteers.

The humanitarian system reports the entry of hundreds of thousands of aid pallets into Gaza during ceasefire windows and negotiated access periods. Yet the presence of aid shipments does not automatically translate into the actual presence of aid and normal consumption patterns.

Damaged roads limit transport, while import restrictions on certain materials, often categorized under security frameworks, slow reconstruction. Employment opportunities remain scarce in large parts of the Strip.

In practical terms, Ramadan in Gaza has shifted from household-based consumption to aid-dependent distribution.

Charity replaces commerce, and communal pots have replaced private kitchens.

Mosques Without Minarets

Many mosques across Gaza sustained damage, and most of them have completely obliterated. However, some are partially operational. Where structures are unsafe, congregational prayers move into open spaces or shelter corridors.

The special Ramadan prayer – Taraweeh – although continued, is offered under emergency lighting, and sometimes outdoors.

Ramadan is traditionally a month of collective rhythm. However, in Gaza, that rhythm competes with displacement patterns that separate families across districts and temporary shelters.

Internal displacement reporting from humanitarian agencies shows that the vast majority of Gaza’s population has experienced at least one displacement cycle since the genocide began.

So, Ramadan, which usually strengthens communal bonds, now unfolds across fragmented social networks.

Children and the Weight of This Ramadan

For children, Ramadan often carries excitement due to special meals, extended nights, and anticipation of Eid.

But this year in Gaza, childhood is shaped by trauma exposure, interrupted schooling, and crowded shelter life.

Education facilities across the Strip sustained heavy damage. In this context, many school buildings continue to function as displacement shelters. Learning remains inconsistent, while psychological support services partially operate under immense strain relative to need.

This Ramadan does not offer a distraction from hardship. It intensifies it because children understand that the environment around them has changed in ways that feel permanent.

Faith in a Managed Reality

Despite all this, fasting continues. The Holy Qur’an is recited in shelters. Charity circulates among families who have little to give, and neighbors share what they receive.

However, resilience should not be romanticized. Spiritual endurance does not remove the need for sovereignty over rebuilding.

Ramadan this year reveals something deeper than devotion. It reveals a population practicing its faith inside a humanitarian crisis rather than a functioning civic structure.

It reveals that survival and worship are unfolding simultaneously, in a landscape where reconstruction plans are debated far beyond Gaza’s borders.

Ramadan in Gaza is not silent. It is disciplined, restrained, and carried out under the weight of destruction that remains visible in every damaged skyline. In a nutshell, the holy month has arrived, but the people are forced to live in abysmal conditions for life.

The role of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) remains doubtful due to its ambiguous mandate and powers. Some people analyze that it can be another force trying to destroy the remains of humanity in Gaza, while others hope it might ensure peacekeeping.

The official language seems to be reassuring order, security, reconstruction, and stabilization. But the real question is what sort of stabilization it is aspiring to and under whose authority?

The new architecture surrounding Gaza’s future represents the most significant external governance blueprint proposed for a territory in years. Although it is presented as a bridge toward recovery, it raises deeper questions about sovereignty, legitimacy, and control.

The Scale of What Is Being Proposed

The stabilization plan reportedly envisions:

• Up to 20,000 international troops
• A program to train 12,000 Palestinian police personnel
• Initial deployment concentrated in Rafah
• Gradual geographic expansion sector by sector

In this backdrop, several countries have signaled troop participation or readiness to contribute security personnel, including Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Albania. Moreover, Egypt and Jordan have been referenced in relation to police training coordination.

This is not a small symbolic observer mission, but a substantial security presence for a territory roughly the size of Detroit.

The numbers alone indicate that this would be one of the most significant foreign security deployments in Gaza’s history.

Why Rafah Matters

The decision to begin in Rafah is not accidental. Rafah is Gaza’s southern gateway, and it controls access to Egypt. It influences humanitarian throughput and is central to trade corridors as well as the movement of goods.

Whoever holds operational control in Rafah influences:

• Reconstruction material flow
• Fuel imports
• Humanitarian distribution
• Commercial reopening

In a territory where reconstruction costs are estimated to exceed $53 billion, control over entry points effectively shapes the speed and nature of rebuilding.

Stabilization beginning at the border is not merely about security but also about economic leverage and how life inside Gaza will be affected.

The Dilemma of the Board of Peace

Parallel to the security force is the formation of a reconstruction governance framework commonly referred to as the “Board of Peace.” The first session was recently convened in the United States.

Its purpose is described as coordinating funding, supervising reconstruction priorities, and structuring administrative transition. On paper, that appears pragmatic, but Gaza requires massive capital and coordinated rebuilding.

When we analyze the past, reconstruction in Gaza has historically been linked to security and compliance conditions. Access to cement, steel, heavy machinery, and dual-use materials has long been subject to restrictions justified under security doctrines by Israel.

If reconstruction funding is tied to demilitarization benchmarks or governance restructuring conditions designed externally, rebuilding becomes conditional rather than sovereign.

This is where the debate shifts from security to political architecture. The people of Palestine want to breathe with safety and security more than ever.

Stabilization vs Sovereignty

Security forces can reduce immediate chaos, deter armed escalation, and protect aid convoys. But security deployment without full Palestinian political authority risks creating a managed environment rather than an empowered one.

The central legitimacy questions are unavoidable:

• Who defines the mandate of the force?
• Under which legal framework will troops operate?
• Who investigates misconduct?
• Who authorizes the use of force?
• What is the timeline for withdrawal?
• What political authority represents Palestinians in this framework?

Without clear answers, stabilization may freeze the genocide for some time rather than resolving it.

A Humanitarian System Becoming a Governance System

Since the conflict escalated, Gaza has increasingly functioned under humanitarian management. UN agencies, NGOs, and emergency distribution networks have sustained basic survival.

That humanitarian framework was never designed to become a long-term governance model.

Yet the introduction of a large multinational security presence, combined with externally supervised reconstruction, risks formalizing a system where Palestinians live under structured oversight rather than self-directed recovery.

The Muslim World’s Dilemma

For Muslim-majority countries signaling participation, the decision is complex.

On one hand:

• Contributing to stabilization can be framed as supporting Palestinian civilians.
• Participation offers diplomatic influence within reconstruction planning.

On the other hand:

• Domestic public opinion in many of these countries remains deeply sympathetic to Palestinian self-determination.
• Being perceived as enforcing externally designed frameworks could damage credibility.

The legitimacy of the stabilization force will depend not only on troop numbers, but on whether Palestinians see it as protection or control.

Reconstruction Cannot Be Security-Only

Rebuilding Gaza is not simply about concrete and policing.

It requires:

• Housing reconstruction at massive scale
• Restoration of power grids
• Rebuilding of water desalination systems
• Revitalization of private-sector employment
• Educational and health system recovery

All of which depend on stable access, political clarity, and local agency.

If reconstruction is conditioned primarily through security compliance metrics rather than civic empowerment, economic dependency could deepen.

The difference between peacekeeping and management lies in who sets the long-term political trajectory.

In a Nutshell

Stabilization can reduce violence for some time but it cannot eradicate the root cause of the issue. Until Israel is completely stopped from genocidal activities in Gaza, the peaceful solution for Palestine is not possible.

If Gaza’s reconstruction and security future are designed primarily in conference rooms outside the territory, even well-funded plans risk reinforcing dependency.

The distinction will define whether the International Stabilization Force becomes a bridge toward sovereignty or an architecture of prolonged oversight.

So, the coming months will determine which path Gaza is placed upon!

The widespread rhetoric about rebuilding Gaza is being presented as a humanitarian necessity, but in reality, it is a political battleground.

The Satellite-based damage assessments indicate that more than 320,000 housing units have been damaged or destroyed. It indicates that entire neighborhoods lie flattened. Moreover, large sections of Gaza’s water networks, sewage systems, hospitals, schools, electricity infrastructure, and road corridors have been rendered inoperable.

Ultimately, this is not a matter of repairing buildings but of reconstructing an entire urban ecosystem. International estimates place the cost of Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction at more than $53 billion. Within this, roughly $20 billion is required in the first three years alone to stabilize essential services and basic infrastructure.

Additionally, some long-term projections push the figure closer to $70 billion when factoring in debris removal, economic revival, and structural reinforcement. However, money alone does not rebuild Gaza.

The Scale of Destruction: A Structural Collapse

The destruction in Gaza is not limited to visible rubble. Beneath collapsed buildings lies a deeper collapse. In this context, power grids, desalination plants, treatment facilities, telecommunications, and medical systems are completely obliterated.

According to the UN estimates, there are around 61 million to 68 million tons of rubble. Clearing debris itself presents a massive logistical challenge. Rubble removal requires heavy machinery, fuel, and unrestricted movement. It also involves the risk of unexploded ordnance embedded within residential ruins. Even this initial phase of recovery is dependent on import permissions and material access.

So, reconstruction cannot begin meaningfully if the supply chain is throttled.

The Price Tag: What $53 Billion Actually Means

The headline figure of $53 billion conceals the complexity of rebuilding:

• Housing reconstruction for hundreds of thousands of displaced families
• Water and sanitation restoration, including pipelines, pumping stations, and desalination facilities
• Electricity infrastructure repair, including transmission lines and fuel systems
• Healthcare and education system rebuilding
• Economic restart mechanisms, including support for small businesses and market reactivation

Without economic revival, reconstruction risks becoming cosmetic. A rebuilt apartment block without jobs, mobility, or functioning trade corridors is not recovery, but containment.

The Central Question: Who Controls the Gate?

Rebuilding Gaza hinges on one decisive factor – control over crossings, imports, and materials.

Israel retains effective control over Gaza’s airspace, maritime access, and land crossings. This control determines what enters the territory, in what quantity, and under what classification. Many materials essential for rebuilding, like cement, steel, electrical components, generators, and heavy equipment, can fall under “dual-use” restrictions, meaning they may be delayed, limited, or blocked entirely.

In past reconstruction cycles, limitations on cement imports alone dramatically slowed housing projects. A single bottleneck can stall thousands of housing units.

The result is a reconstruction process that is conditional, monitored, and dependent. Pledges of billions become symbolic if trucks cannot cross consistently and materials cannot flow freely.

The Board of Peace and Conditional Reconstruction

The recently announced “Board of Peace” and discussions surrounding Phase Two of post-war governance have introduced a new political architecture around reconstruction.

This framework reportedly includes:

• A multi-billion-dollar reconstruction fund
• Proposals for an international stabilization presence
• Governance restructuring discussions
• Demilitarization conditions tied to reconstruction access

But here lies the core controversy. If rebuilding is conditioned on political restructuring designed externally, reconstruction shifts from humanitarian necessity to strategic leverage. The linking of reconstruction funds to security and governance conditions effectively transforms infrastructure into bargaining currency.

For Palestinians in Gaza, this creates a troubling equation – recovery becomes contingent not simply on peace, but on compliance with externally framed political terms.

Who Will Pay?

Although the financing landscape is controversial and ambiguous, it is being reflected and layered as follows.

1. Gulf States

GCC countries possess the financial capacity to contribute substantially. Historically, they have played a role in Gaza reconstruction. Although they are ready to contribute, they want reassurance for Gaza’s peaceful future.

2. Western Governments

Western funding typically includes strict monitoring mechanisms and governance conditions. Aid is often routed through vetted channels to ensure oversight, which in practice can slow implementation.

3. Multilateral Institutions

Institutions such as development banks require transparency, security assurances, and administrative clarity before releasing large-scale funds. They do not operate in political vacuums because access and governance legitimacy are their prerequisites.

4. Private Sector and NGOs

While essential for humanitarian relief, NGOs cannot finance or execute state-scale rebuilding without stable import regimes and secure operational conditions.

Pledges may reach billions, but actual disbursement depends on political agreement.

Who Benefits from Reconstruction?

What Gaza needs this time is peace and respite from genocide. And reconstruction is not only about homes, but about the rehabilitation of the entire socio-economic spectrum.

Large regional construction firms may secure contracts. International contractors may enter under donor supervision. Local businesses may either be empowered or sidelined, depending on procurement structures.

If reconstruction flows primarily through externally approved channels, a new class of intermediaries can emerge. It will include permit holders, subcontractors, and import brokers. Restrictions often inflate prices and create scarcity premiums, distorting the local market.

There is also a major risk of “reconstruction dependency”. When rebuilding cycles follow destruction cycles without structural political resolution, the economy shifts from productive growth to aid management.

This pattern has repeated earlier in history, too, with destruction, donor conferences, partial rebuild, and renewed destruction. Without sovereignty and stability, reconstruction remains temporary.

The Human Dimension: Recovery Without Stability

More than infrastructure is at stake. Displacement remains widespread, while families who lost everything face prolonged uncertainty. Health systems remain strained, with limited access to specialized treatment and medical evacuations.

Rebuilding a hospital is one challenge, and ensuring consistent medicine supply chains is another.

Rebuilding housing is necessary, while guaranteeing that families will not face renewed displacement is equally critical.

Without legitimate guarantees against repeated devastation, reconstruction feels fragile.

Reconstruction as Leverage

The uncomfortable reality is that control over materials, crossings, and security architecture allows reconstruction to be shaped by external actors.

When the entry of basic materials depends on political alignment, rebuilding becomes permission-based. It ceases to be a right and becomes a managed process.

For Palestinians, the fear is not merely slow reconstruction. It is reconstruction that stabilizes dependency rather than restoring autonomy.

If border controls remain restrictive, trade corridors remain limited, and internal governance is externally dictated, Gaza risks being rebuilt structurally while remaining politically constrained.

The Larger Question

Rebuilding Gaza is not only about money, but about power. Who controls entry points determines pace, who sets political conditions determines structure, and who administers funds determines beneficiaries.

The international community can mobilize resources, regional powers can pledge funds, and the institutions can design oversight mechanisms.

But unless Palestinians possess meaningful control over their own reconstruction process, the rebuild risks becoming another chapter in a long cycle of externally managed survival. In a nutshell, buildings can be reconstructed with capital, but dignity and sovereignty require something more!