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Rafah First: Why the New Gaza Stabilization Plan Starts at the Border

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The role of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) remains doubtful due to its ambiguous mandate and powers. Some people analyze that it can be another force trying to destroy the remains of humanity in Gaza, while others hope it might ensure peacekeeping.

The official language seems to be reassuring order, security, reconstruction, and stabilization. But the real question is what sort of stabilization it is aspiring to and under whose authority?

The new architecture surrounding Gaza’s future represents the most significant external governance blueprint proposed for a territory in years. Although it is presented as a bridge toward recovery, it raises deeper questions about sovereignty, legitimacy, and control.

The Scale of What Is Being Proposed

The stabilization plan reportedly envisions:

  • Up to 20,000 international troops
  • A program to train 12,000 Palestinian police personnel
  • Initial deployment concentrated in Rafah
  • Gradual geographic expansion sector by sector

In this backdrop, several countries have signaled troop participation or readiness to contribute security personnel, including Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Albania. Moreover, Egypt and Jordan have been referenced in relation to police training coordination.

This is not a small symbolic observer mission, but a substantial security presence for a territory roughly the size of Detroit.

The numbers alone indicate that this would be one of the most significant foreign security deployments in Gaza’s history.

Why Rafah Matters

The decision to begin in Rafah is not accidental. Rafah is Gaza’s southern gateway, and it controls access to Egypt. It influences humanitarian throughput and is central to trade corridors as well as the movement of goods.

Whoever holds operational control in Rafah influences:

  • Reconstruction material flow
  • Fuel imports
  • Humanitarian distribution
  • Commercial reopening

In a territory where reconstruction costs are estimated to exceed $53 billion, control over entry points effectively shapes the speed and nature of rebuilding.

Stabilization beginning at the border is not merely about security but also about economic leverage and how life inside Gaza will be affected.

The Dilemma of the Board of Peace

Parallel to the security force is the formation of a reconstruction governance framework commonly referred to as the “Board of Peace.” The first session was recently convened in the United States.

Its purpose is described as coordinating funding, supervising reconstruction priorities, and structuring administrative transition. On paper, that appears pragmatic, but Gaza requires massive capital and coordinated rebuilding.

When we analyze the past, reconstruction in Gaza has historically been linked to security and compliance conditions. Access to cement, steel, heavy machinery, and dual-use materials has long been subject to restrictions justified under security doctrines by Israel.

If reconstruction funding is tied to demilitarization benchmarks or governance restructuring conditions designed externally, rebuilding becomes conditional rather than sovereign.

This is where the debate shifts from security to political architecture. The people of Palestine want to breathe with safety and security more than ever.

Stabilization vs Sovereignty

Security forces can reduce immediate chaos, deter armed escalation, and protect aid convoys. But security deployment without full Palestinian political authority risks creating a managed environment rather than an empowered one.

The central legitimacy questions are unavoidable:

  • Who defines the mandate of the force?
  • Under which legal framework will troops operate?
  • Who investigates misconduct?
  • Who authorizes the use of force?
  • What is the timeline for withdrawal?
  • What political authority represents Palestinians in this framework?

Without clear answers, stabilization may freeze the genocide for some time rather than resolving it.

A Humanitarian System Becoming a Governance System

Since the conflict escalated, Gaza has increasingly functioned under humanitarian management. UN agencies, NGOs, and emergency distribution networks have sustained basic survival.

That humanitarian framework was never designed to become a long-term governance model.

Yet the introduction of a large multinational security presence, combined with externally supervised reconstruction, risks formalizing a system where Palestinians live under structured oversight rather than self-directed recovery.

The Muslim World’s Dilemma

For Muslim-majority countries signaling participation, the decision is complex.

On one hand:

  • Contributing to stabilization can be framed as supporting Palestinian civilians.
  • Participation offers diplomatic influence within reconstruction planning.

On the other hand:

  • Domestic public opinion in many of these countries remains deeply sympathetic to Palestinian self-determination.
  • Being perceived as enforcing externally designed frameworks could damage credibility.

The legitimacy of the stabilization force will depend not only on troop numbers, but on whether Palestinians see it as protection or control.

Reconstruction Cannot Be Security-Only

Rebuilding Gaza is not simply about concrete and policing.

It requires:

  • Housing reconstruction at massive scale
  • Restoration of power grids
  • Rebuilding of water desalination systems
  • Revitalization of private-sector employment
  • Educational and health system recovery

All of which depend on stable access, political clarity, and local agency.

If reconstruction is conditioned primarily through security compliance metrics rather than civic empowerment, economic dependency could deepen.

The difference between peacekeeping and management lies in who sets the long-term political trajectory.

In a Nutshell

Stabilization can reduce violence for some time but it cannot eradicate the root cause of the issue. Until Israel is completely stopped from genocidal activities in Gaza, the peaceful solution for Palestine is not possible.

If Gaza’s reconstruction and security future are designed primarily in conference rooms outside the territory, even well-funded plans risk reinforcing dependency.

The distinction will define whether the International Stabilization Force becomes a bridge toward sovereignty or an architecture of prolonged oversight.

So, the coming months will determine which path Gaza is placed upon!

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